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Pandemic influenza communication: views from a deliberative forum 
Abstract 
Objective To use a deliberative forum to elicit community perspectives on communication about 
pandemic influenza planning, and to compare these findings with the current Australian national 
communication strategy. Design Deliberative forum of 12 persons randomly selected from urban South 
Australia. Forum members were briefed by experts in infection control, virology, ethics and public policy 
before deliberating on four key questions: what, how and when should the community be told about 
pandemic influenza and by whom? Results The forum recommended provision of detailed and 
comprehensive information by credible experts, rather than politicians, using a variety of media including 
television and internet. Recommendations included cumulative communication to build expertise in the 
community, and specific strategies to include groups such as young people, people with physical or 
mental disabilities, and rural and remote communities. Information provided should be practical, accurate, 
and timely, with no 'holding back' about the seriousness of a pandemic. The forum expressed confidence 
in the expert witnesses, despite the acknowledged uncertainty of many of the predictions. Discussion and 
Conclusion The deliberative forum's recommendations were largely consistent with the Australian 
national pandemic influenza communication strategy and the relevant literature. However, the forum 
recommended: release of more detailed information than currently proposed in the national strategy; use 
of non‐political spokespersons; and use of novel communication methods. Their acceptance of 
uncertainty suggests that policy makers should be open about the limits of knowledge in potentially 
threatening situations. Our findings show that deliberative forums can provide community perspectives 
on topics such as communication about pandemic influenza. 
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Abstract
Objective To use a deliberative forum to elicit community perspec-
tives on communication about pandemic influenza planning, and to
compare these findings with the current Australian national com-
munication strategy.
Design Deliberative forum of 12 persons randomly selected from
urban South Australia. Forum members were briefed by experts in
infection control, virology, ethics and public policy before deliber-
ating on four key questions: what, how and when should the
community be told about pandemic influenza and by whom?
Results The forum recommended provision of detailed and com-
prehensive information by credible experts, rather than politicians,
using a variety of media including television and internet. Recom-
mendations included cumulative communication to build expertise
in the community, and specific strategies to include groups such as
young people, people with physical or mental disabilities, and rural
and remote communities. Information provided should be practical,
accurate, and timely, with no holding back about the seriousness of
a pandemic. The forum expressed confidence in the expert witnesses,
despite the acknowledged uncertainty of many of the predictions.
Discussion and Conclusion The deliberative forums recommenda-
tions were largely consistent with the Australian national pandemic
influenza communication strategy and the relevant literature.
However, the forum recommended: release of more detailed
information than currently proposed in the national strategy; use
of non-political spokespersons; and use of novel communication
methods. Their acceptance of uncertainty suggests that policy
makers should be open about the limits of knowledge in potentially
threatening situations. Our findings show that deliberative forums
can provide community perspectives on topics such as communica-
tion about pandemic influenza.
doi: 10.1111/j.1369-7625.2009.00562.x
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Introduction
Governments around the world rely upon pan-
demic influenza (PI) planning to protect their
countries against the potentially devastating
impact of a pandemic. Communication has been
recognized as a critical part of PI planning.
Authorities including the World Health Organi-
sation (WHO) have issued guidelines, claiming
that communication expertise is as important as
epidemiological and laboratory expertise for
control of outbreaks.1 Specific PI-related com-
munication strategies in national PI plans2 are
complemented by a burgeoning literature on risk
communication,3–5 together with analyses of
communication in previous crises such as the 2003
outbreaks of SevereAcuteRespiratory Syndrome
(SARS)6,7 and Hurricane Katrina.8,9 There is
growing consensus about principles of risk and
crisis communication, embracing concepts such
as trustworthiness, transparency, responsiveness,
respect, candour and practicality.1,10,11
This literature provides a foundation for
governments developing their own PI commu-
nication strategies, such as the Communication
Strategy Overview12 published as an annex to the
Australian governments Australian Health
Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza.13
There is, however, an additional source of
expertise that can contribute to pandemic com-
munication planning: the public. Their views can
be accessed in a variety of ways, each with
strengths and weaknesses.14 Deliberative forums
are one method of tapping into the community
to explore approaches to an issue or problem.15
Deliberative methods provide opportunities for
citizens to articulate and share values.15,16
Forums are similar to citizens juries in that a
population sample deliberates about an issue
after receiving expert information.17 Like juries,
forums share the theoretical assumption that,
given enough information about a topic, a small
group can provide views that are informed and
reflective of community values.
This study reports results from the FluViews
project which used deliberative methods to
obtain community views about issues related to
PI planning. One 2-day forum held in 2008
elicited views on communication and quaran-
tine ⁄ social distancing measures in a pandemic;
the results relating to communication are
reported here. In choosing the format of the
forum, we recognized, given the complexity of
the issues presented by pandemic management,
that the forum should explore the social con-
struction that influences peoples decision mak-
ing15 and must allow for divergent views.
FluVIews was overseen by a steering group of
policy makers and academic experts working in
PI planning and infectious diseases.
Methods
A market research company from the Adelaide
metropolitan area recruited forum members to
fulfil these criteria:
• Sex: 50% female.
• Age: one-third each from age ranges 18–34,
35–54 and 55+.
• Employment: 50% in paid work.
• Household income: 50% below $800 ⁄week.
Potential members were randomly selected
from a database weighted by age, sex and geo-
graphical location to reflect accurately the South
Australian population.18 Recruiting continued
until all places were filled. Forum members
received an honorarium of AUD$300 and travel
expenses.
Available evidence about PI and communi-
cation, collated using systematic literature
reviews, was summarized for members in two-
page modules written in simple language. The
topics were: seasonal influenza, PI and future
pandemic risks; logistical, political and policy
issues related to communication about health
and emergencies; effectiveness of strategies for
pandemic communication; and related ethical
issues. Strenuous efforts were made to ensure
that the reviews were systematic and balanced.
Where evidence was contentious the forum was
informed about the nature of the controversy,
the range of views in the peer reviewed literature
and the strength of available evidence. The
modules were evaluated and ultimately
approved by all members of the steering group.
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The forum met in a hotel meeting room over
2 days, with 1 day devoted to the question:
What is an acceptable framework for commu-
nication in an influenza pandemic? Members sat
around a single table, where they were joined by
experts in infectious disease, ethics and public
policy. There were fewer experts and observers
than forum members. Members were asked to
act as citizens and community representatives
rather than as individuals in the deliberation
and decision-making process. A trained inde-
pendent facilitator called experts and refocused
discussion as necessary.
The forum reflected on the questions using
progressive scenarios that moved through a
hypothetical PI outbreak in Australia (see
Box 1). Prior to discussion of each scenario,
there were short accessible and interactive pre-
sentations by the experts with on-going oppor-
tunities for members to ask questions. At each
stage, members deliberated on what, how and
when the community should be told about PI
and by whom. The facilitator supported indi-
vidual reflection, discussion in small groups,
brainstorming and whole group discussion.
Participants were encouraged to state and dis-
cuss their views, seek further information from
experts, and then reach a broad consensus in
their responses. Care was taken to demonstrate
respect for the members views.
Material was recorded on an electronic
whiteboard to facilitate brainstorming and
reaching consensus. A professional reporter with
back-up voice recording transcribed forum
deliberations verbatim. No formal votes were
taken on specific recommendations.
The data consisted of copies of white board
screens containing forum recommendations,
anonymized transcripts and contemporaneous
notes. The transcripts were checked by one
author (WR) to add depth to the recommenda-
tions with illustrative comments and these were
cross-checked against an independent summary
of the data prepared by JS. Current Australian
PI communication strategies were evaluated
against the forums responses.
The Human Research Ethics Committee of
the University of Adelaide approved this study.
Findings
Participant characteristics are in Table 1.
Table 2 lists the summary recommendations
that were developed by the group as agreed and
recorded on the whiteboard. Table 3 contains a
more detailed outline of the results presented by
Box 1 Hypothetical scenarios used by deliberative forum
Scenario 1: Before a pandemic
Information was provided about the current world situation including the potential for pandemic influenza, the limited
evidence for communication strategies, political and ethical issues associated with communication, and international
recommendations
Scenario 2: During the pandemic – containment stage
This was a hypothetical scenario of an international outbreak of pandemic influenza, predominately in Indonesia and
Vietnam. The first Australian cases are in a NSW family who holidayed in Bali. The 19-year-old daughter has died, and
suspected cases have been reported in the familys suburb in northern Sydney. Contact tracing is underway and some
people have been asked to remain in voluntary isolation or quarantine. The epidemiology of this influenza strain
is unknown although it appears to affect all ages. At this stage the spread of the virus is highly localized
Scenario 3: During the pandemic – maintenance stage
This was a hypothetical scenario set in week 5 of a full pandemic. The influenza virus is now widespread throughout
most major capital and regional centres in Australia. In South Australia, approximately 200 000 cases have been reported
with 1232 deaths. [These figures were based on modelling by (Graham Tucker, Health SA) using FluAID software (CDC) and
a projected 25% attack rate. The SA Health plan forecasts 46 000 new cases per week with 2600 deaths over 8 weeks.]
Half of the deaths have been people aged below fifty. Flu clinics, set up in council offices around the state, are working
to capacity and the major metropolitan hospital is finding it hard to cope with the high number of cases. Only remote rural
areas appear to be unaffected. The virus is transmitting rapidly between people, and more and more people are staying
home from work, school and social engagements because they are afraid of catching the virus
Pandemic influenza communication, W A Rogers et al.
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question (what, how, who and when) with each
section covering the stages in the scenarios
(Box 1). We have chosen to include direct quotes
from participants to illustrate the findings.
What information should the public receive about
PI?
Scenario 1: Before a pandemic (see Box 1)
Participants were surprised at their lack of
knowledge or awareness of H5N1 and the
potential for PI. They recommended three topics
of public information for this phase: the current
situation and its implications; information about
PI; and information about seasonal influenza:
…not many people are aware of the situa-
tion…and, for example, I could ask my three
children a bit about the bird flu and how aware
they are of that in other countries, and Im sure
they couldnt give me much of an answer. (Ross,
p5: 22–27)
Pandemic influenzawas seen to be a potentially
confusing and frightening topic that could be
managed by provision of detailed information:
I think people need to know the truth. Not watered
down or sensationalised, just the truth. (Nanette p
7–8)
The forum recommended comprehensive
information:
First, you need to explain what a pandemic is and
what is the flu and what is the current disease sit-
uation…Then, explain to people how they can
prepare themselves by vaccinations and general
hygiene, and explain who is more at risk, like the
young and the elderly, and maybe what is the
governments plan to stop the pandemic killing
everyone. (Tayla p6: 26–33)
Providinginformationaboutseasonal influenza
was seenas anopportunity to link this toPI,with a
focus on the importance of personal hygiene:
Its about getting people into the habit of doing it
so when the big scary stuff comes they are already
in the habit. (Karen p15: 28–30)
The discussion revealed confusion over vac-
cination for seasonal influenza, and the need for
more public information about potential bene-
fits of higher vaccination rates for the commu-
nity and employers:
…how aware are people about flu shots?…People
are not aware of even the current situation with flu
shots. (Ross p14: 5–15)
Members distinguished between providing
information to raise awareness of the potential for
Table 1 Forum characteristics




















Year 10 or 11 2
Year 12 4
Diploma or trade certificate 4
University degree 1
Not provided 1
Table 2 Summary recommendations from deliberative forum
on communication in a pandemic
That our society should spend money on
communicating pandemic plans and precautions and
that this information should:
Be available prior to the arrival of a pandemic
Be introduced over time
Use existing communication mechanisms and
public-private partnerships
Commence immediately
That communication should be truthful, emphasize the
ease with which PI can spread, the extent of the risk
to citizens of all ages and that the onset may be sudden
That during a pandemic, all information including accurate
infection and mortality rates be made available (not
watered down) and that this information should be
relayed by the relevant health authority in conjunction
with high level politicians
That there should be a one stop shop on the internet to
provide pandemic disease information
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PI, and providing detailed information. Late in
the discussion of Scenario 1, the view was that:
Even if…people dont have the specific informa-
tion now, just knowing where to get the informa-
tion from. You dont have to stand there and talk
for 15 min on the television saying This is it, but if
people…know where they can access the infor-
mation from and really quickly, I think that that
would make a huge amount of difference as well.
(Jane p26: 30–36)
Scenario 2: During the pandemic – containment
stage (see Box 1)
In this scenario, the forum emphasized the need
to inform the public that a pandemic may be
imminent, provide practical information, and
release information about the index case. Prac-
tical information should include telling people
that the threat applied to them and ways to
protect themselves:
I would probably want to know how to look after
myself and my loved ones. (Raelene p44: 3–36)
Participants unanimously recommended that
information about a first or index case should be
released by someone in authority. There was
some discussion about privacy, with the con-
sensus being to identify the location by suburb:
In this case its a highly contagious virus and it kills
people. Privacy aside, people need to know.
(Nanette p49: 27–28)
Table 3 Findings from deliberative forum on communication in a pandemic
Before a pandemic
(Scenario 1)
During a pandemic –
containment stage
(Scenario 2)











2. Raise awareness of potential
for PI
1. Accurate and credible
information about the
imminence of a pandemic
2. Practical information about
what to do
3. Information about location















1. Clear and easily understood
language
2. Digestible amounts of
information
3. Increasing in content and
complexity
4. Use of television with
a range of formats
5. Community settings and
distribution networks
6. Education through schools
7. Use of internet to reach young
people, rural and remote
communities, people with
disabilities, and working people
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The forum justified this recommendation due
to the severity of the threat, the need for accu-
rate and credible information, and the potential
for rapid spread:
Its like being forewarned about a tornado coming, you
can take preventative measures, you can buy up 20 l of
water or 3 weeks worth of food. (Neil p47: 8–10)
Participants discussed the role of the media
and a possible media ban to protect privacy of
those affected by PI, but finally agreed that a
ban would be counter productive as media co-
operation would be necessary for transmitting
other information about the pandemic.
Scenario 3: During the pandemic – maintenance
stage (see Box 1)
The emphasis upon practical information con-
tinued in Scenario 3, together with an identified
need for general information about both the
progress of the pandemic and the functioning of
society. Progress updates should include bad
news as well as good:
I want to know as bad as it sounds, death counts,
all the bad stuff. Just updates but also hope stories
of people who get better. (Tayla p62: 28–30)
Practical issues included health-care arrange-
ments and advice on self-care together with
information about essential goods and services,
and what to do if unable to work due to illness:
What other services are affected in your local area
especially, what the case is as far as hospitals,
doctors surgeries… (Ross p63: 34–36)
If I am not working, how do my bills get paid?
(Raelene p64: 14)
The forum indicated the importance of accu-
rate information during this potentially chaotic
pandemic phase:
I want to make sure the information I am getting is
correct coming from heaps of different sources.
(Matt p75: 23–24)
How should this information be communicated?
Scenario 1: Before a pandemic (see Box 1)
The forum raised obvious but important points
about communication methods, such as the need
for clear and simple language, and developing
awareness and understanding over time, so that
if and when a pandemic occurs, people will be
prepared.
Television was recommended for a number
of roles including: updates on PI; in-depth
interviews with experts; advertisements about
further sources of information; and advertise-
ments about seasonal influenza to foster
community attitudes about preventive mea-
sures:
If there was an ad on TV saying Thanks for get-
ting your flu shot, that would encourage me in the
next year. (Karen p13: 31–32)
Other recommendations included posters in
community settings (e.g. libraries), council
newsletters, government websites and distribu-
tion of household leaflets. One novel idea was
for reputable non-government organizations,
such as the Red Cross, to provide face-to-face
explanations:
…a large organisation like Red Cross…go and
door-knock and explain to the people in that
street, were they aware of what this was and it was
a possible thing that was coming to Australia, but
not to alarm them but do it through a large
organisation, a large respected company like Red
Cross. (Ross p5: 36–42)
Education of school children was seen as a
way of raising awareness and developing
a cohort of informed and prepared future
citizens:
…its about making sure the education is contin-
uous, so they bring it up into their adulthood.
(Jane p19: 4–6)
The forum recommended communication
with specific groups, including young people
(using internet sites such as Facebook, MySpace
or YouTube), rural and remote communities,
people with physical or mental disabilities, and
working people. Regional television was viewed
as an important resource for reaching remote
communities, as were existing services such as
outback visiting ministers.
Alongside these recommendations about
methods, participants argued that information
should accumulate gradually, without repetition,
to develop community expertise.
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Scenario 2: During the pandemic – containment
stage (see Box 1)
News about an Australian case could be
broadcast as part of any existing regular PI
updates, because a sensitized population would
understand the implications. In the absence of
adequate background information, partici-
pants thought that only significant media
attention would alert people to the potential
threat:
I dont think I would be too concerned until it is on
every channel of TV… (Tayla p44: 21)
They recommended that information be
provided via government announcements in the
media and on government websites, plus a well-
publicized dedicated hotline.
Scenario 3: During the pandemic – maintenance
stage (see Box 1)
Forum members agreed the need for regular
updates on pandemic progress and for a dedi-
cated source of information available at all
times. Members were divided over whether this
should be television, internet or both:
It would be good if you could have an extra half an
hour added onto the news…maybe two or three
times a day for the different people who watch the
news. (Karen p64: 31–34)
[G]overnment help web sites that everybody could
dial into and get current updates. The updates
would be done every couple of hours. (Neil p68:
45–47)
Radio was also identified as a valuable com-
munication medium in an emergency:
The handy thing with radio is you can have bat-
teries, whereas television, if the power goes out…
(Bill p68: 31–32)
Who should communicate?
Scenario 1: Before a pandemic (see Box 1)
The forum identified the need for media
spokespeople who would be trusted by the
Australian community: experts rather than
politicians; and the involvement of interna-
tionally recognized authorities such as the
WHO:
You would listen to the big guns, wouldnt you?
You would take it seriously if they [WHO] are
getting involved. (Karen p23: 14–15)
General practitioners were identified as
important sources of information:
…when you go to the GP, the GP is able to give far
more information to the individuals in educating
them and pamphlets and stuff like that. (Jane p3:
43–45)
As discussed above, non-government organi-
zations were considered to be trustworthy for
unsolicited information.
There was consensus that communication
should not be used for political point scoring,
and that it was a government responsibility to
inform the public and provide information
through a range of channels.
Scenario 2: During the pandemic – containment
stage (see Box 1)
As with Scenario 1, the forum recommended an
official spokesperson or expert with authority as
the appropriate person to make announcements.
It was suggested that information from affected
individuals would also be effective:
Maybe someone who got better…Or maybe
someone who got sick to scare people. (Tayla p54:
39–43)
Scenario 3: During the pandemic – maintenance
stage (see Box 1)
There were few additional recommendations,
other than that:
At that stage I wouldnt care who was presenting
it. If its someone credible, okay, who is healthy.
(Tayla p64: 42–43)
When should communication occur?
Scenario 1: Before a pandemic (see Box 1)
The final question related to the timing of public
communication. The forums view was that the
community needed immediate information
about the threat, and that, in so far as they were
representative of South Australians, the com-
munity was currently under-informed. There
was a feeling that if PI breaks out, it would be
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too late to provide necessary background
information, or for people to have developed
protective personal hygiene habits:
Are we going to wait? Is it only important when its
here?…What I am saying is it needs to be impor-
tant now, because when its here there is no time to
plan and do all that… (Karen p24: 38–42)
As described above, the forum recommended
a sophisticated approach to the question of
when information should be communicated.
Prior to an outbreak the emphasis should be
upon raising awareness of the potential problem
and sources of further information. Detailed
information would only be necessary once a
pandemic was imminent.
Scenario 2: During the pandemic – containment
stage (see Box 1)
The members recommended that Australians be
informed as soon as there were confirmed cases
in Australia, due to the serious nature of PI and
the potential for rapid spread.
Scenario 3: During the pandemic – maintenance
stage (see Box 1)
At this stage, participants felt that information
should be available continuously and updated
frequently.
Throughout the day, members commented on
the fact that, until their involvement in this
project, they had known little about either the
threat of PI or about existing government
planning. This was seen as problematic:
What is the point of having them [government
preparations] if people dont know about them,
some of those things?…I didnt know any of that.
Its nice to know they have done stuff. (Karen p32:
33–43)
Discussion
The forums recommendations about the content
of communication during a pandemic are largely
consistent with the strategies described in the
Australian government Communication Strategy
Overview (hereafter the Strategy).12 In particular,
the key objectives (see Box 2) are similar to forum
recommendations, focusing initially on building
awareness followed by practical information
about minimizing personal and community risks,
and what to do if affected. These objectives are
supported by the literature on information strat-
egies to effect behaviour change4,11 and reduce
public anxiety and criticism.10
There are, however, some notable differences.
First, the forum wanted full and frank infor-
mation about the potential risk and interna-
tional developments including numbers of cases
and fatalities. It is not clear whether the Stage 1
key message What is the current disease situa-
tion anticipates this level of detail. Given the
level of prior knowledge amongst participants,
either such detail is not planned, or the strategy
to date has been unsuccessful.19 There is evi-
dence that people do want the truth during a
crisis, even if this is bleak.10 Providing infor-
mation about the potentially deadly nature of an
infection increases concern in the population
which is associated with taking precautions to
protect against infection.20
Second, although forum members understood
that predictions about PI were uncertain, this
Box 2 Key objective for Stages 1–3 of the Australian PI
communication strategy
Key communication objectives Stage 1
Communications activities during Communication
Stage 1 aim to build a base level of awareness and
understanding across the general public and primary
care providers regarding the nature of the risk of
avian influenza and the threat of an influenza pandemic
(Ref. 12, p. 6)
Key communication objectives Stage 2
Communications activities during Communication
Stage 2 aim to build strong awareness of the pandemic
threat and what can be done to prepare, including, the
personal actions that can be undertaken to minimize the
impact of the disease in Australia (Ref. 12, p. 9)
Key communication objectives Stage 3
Communications activities during the Communication
Stage 3 will inform and reinforce the need for the
appropriate actions that will minimize disease
transmission and that will support the maintenance
of essential community services. The communications
strategy will be enhanced to support the deployment of
the National Medicines Stockpile and a pandemic
vaccine, once it is available (Ref. 12, p. 11)
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did not lead to loss of confidence in the experts
or the information they imparted. This is con-
sistent with findings that acknowledging uncer-
tainty can increase public confidence.21
Information about communicating uncertainty
is currently absent from the Strategy.
Third, the forum recommended releasing
geographically localizing information about
initial cases. The Strategy does not indicate how
information about individual cases will be han-
dled. In general, health departments maintain
confidentiality, releasing information only if this
will prevent further cases. Despite recognizing
this, forum members argued that the magnitude
and severity of the threat justified release of
potentially identifying information.
Discussions about breaking the news of Aus-
tralian cases of PI exposed a range of percep-
tions about distance. A threat in a city 1700-km
distant was seen by some as quite proximate but
by others as distant and hence less significant,
indicating that awareness of varying perceptions
about the significance of distance is important in
communication about PI.
For communication methods, the Strategy
relies upon the Australian Department of Health
and Ageing (DoHA) website, its toll-free tele-
phone line, and media activities including inter-
views, special articles on prevention, and public
announcements. To date, these methods of
communication appear unsuccessful in develop-
ing a base level of awareness, as per our partic-
ipants comments. As of September 2008, the PI
toll-free number is difficult to locate on the
DoHA website (it appears on the avian influ-
enza, rather than the PI website). Toll-free
numbers were heavily utilized during SARS,22
indicating their potential contribution in a pan-
demic.
The forums recommendations for education
through schools are important for developing
community-wide expertise about and good
habits in infection control and personal hygiene.
The Strategy does not take a whole of commu-
nity approach that includes school activities.
[We note that the South Australian Department
of Health has instigated a hand hygiene cam-
paign (Wash, wipe, cover) for schools as part of
its PI planning.] The recommendation to build
awareness of seasonal influenza through feed-
back and thank you messages deserves consid-
eration as a way of supporting related messages
in the Strategy. Using volunteers from organi-
zations such as Red Cross to provide door-
to-door information highlights the potential
contribution of the volunteer sector in a pan-
demic, a group not mentioned in the Strategy.
The forum was in disagreement about the value
of distributing household leaflets, but interest-
ingly, despite thinking this ineffective, most
members remembered recent government infor-
mation leaflets delivered to their homes.
The forum recommended increasing use of
television and websites, including those targeting
youth and rural and remote groups as the pan-
demic developed. This is consistent with plans
for a national information campaign, with
media activities intensifying as infection spreads.
Research following the SARS outbreak found
that television was the primary source of infor-
mation in China;23 this is similar to US data
unrelated to SARS.7 The internet emerged as a
new method of emergency health communica-
tion during SARS.6,24 Information found on-
line can change health-related behaviour.25
Australians increasingly use the internet for
news26 indicating that it may be an effective
medium for PI communication.
The literature is uniform about the need for
consistent messages as a key feature of effective
communication.27 Inconsistency can affect
compliance with public health directives28 and
lead to public distrust.29 The Strategy identifies
Australias Chief Medical Officer as the principal
spokesperson, with additional contributions
from Ministers including the Prime Minister, an
approach that may ensure consistency. Unlike
the Strategy and some commentators,30 the
forum did not recommend a single spokesper-
son, but rather a range of people including
experts and personalities, to make the message
real. Members argued that politicians may not
be trusted, but that Ministerial level spokes-
people would add gravitas in tandem with more
trustworthy experts. Experience from SARS
demonstrates the success of multiple voices31,32
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particularly in expanding the audience, as long
as messages remain uniform.
Finally, there is the issue of when to com-
municate. Our forum recommended immediate
activities to educate and build awareness and
swift action if and when Australia has its first
cases of PI. This is consistent with other pan-
demic experiences including the 1918 influenza
in which early implementation of multiple
interventions was associated with reduced dis-
ease transmission.33 The WHO notes that it is
impossible to keep outbreaks hidden; accord-
ingly, it recommends early official announce-
ment to minimize rumours and misinformation.1
Some commentators believe that too much
information can lead to people switching off or
getting pandemic fatigue.3 This danger was
recognised by the forum who argued for a
campaign that built up community expertise
without losing the audience. The Strategy does
not indicate how rapidly information would be
made public during the various communication
stages, but there is no suggestion that informa-
tion would be withheld.
Limitations and evaluation of the study
Deliberative methods aim to access individuals
expertise as community members to provide
views and recommendations about policy. Our
forum was composed of randomly selected par-
ticipants, who were provided with information
that they were encouraged to discuss before
reaching their recommendations. In these
aspects, it resembled a citizens jury. There were
however, differences. Our forum was asked for
their views about communication needs, rather
than asked to choose or prioritize amongst
options as commonly occurs with juries. In
addition, the forum did not deliberate in private
to reach ordered or unanimous recommenda-
tions. This decision was partly pragmatic as PI
communication is a broad topic for which there
is little hard evidence about effective strategies.
It was also influenced by our desire to seek the
maximum information possible given the rela-
tive expense of staging a forum. At times, it was
difficult for the forum to remain focussed on the
questions, leading to recommendations less clear
cut than, for example, ordering a set of health-
care priorities. Members of the forum were very
curious about PI leading to an occasional blur-
ring of the distinction between their requests for
information (as forum members) and their views
about information recommended for the public.
A more formal process would have avoided this
problem; however, this may have been at risk of
losing some of the range of views expressed.
Despite these shortcomings, we believe that
the deliberative forum is a valuable method for
eliciting informed community views and values
to inform PI planning and policy. In contrast to
focus groups, which also seek a wide range of
views, the length and format of the forum meant
that participants based their deliberations upon
a large amount of specialised information. Our
forum met key principles proposed for public
participation processes:14 it was a demographi-
cally representative sample, provided with
information that was accessible and compre-
hensive, conducted in a respectful way with clear
procedural rules. The results of the forums have
been provided on request to the Pandemic
Influenza Sub-committee of the Coalition of
Australian Governments and have been pre-
sented at international conferences and meet-
ings.
Conclusion
Effective communication is critical for the suc-
cessful implementation of PI plans. As each
public health emergency and each pandemic
occurs in its own unique context, it is difficult to
move beyond theoretical principles of commu-
nication. Planners and policy makers therefore
face challenges in developing evidence-based
communication strategies. A deliberative forum
provides one avenue for seeking informed com-
munity views on PI communication planning.
The recommendations of the forum are consis-
tent with the literature on pandemic communi-
cation strategies and, to a large extent, with the
current Australian Strategy. This finding confers
some confidence in the Strategy whilst also
providing valuable feedback together with sug-
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gestions for improving communication through
the use of multiple spokespersons and additional
communication modes.
Using a forum to deliberate on a broad topic
such as PI communication is innovative. We
have demonstrated that this method can be used
to elicit informed recommendations that are
relevant for policy and planning. Using a forum
rather than other methods such as focus groups
ensured that participant deliberations were
based upon the best available evidence and local
expertise, thereby ensuring relevant recommen-
dations.
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